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If a nation wants to pursue freedom and equality in today’s world where the weak serve as 
meat on which the strong can dine, they first must train strong and fit bodies.1 
So wrote Wang Zhengting, Chinese Foreign Minister and President of the China Na­
tional Amateur Athletic Federation (CNAAF), in 1930 on the significance of the Olym­
pic Games. Wang’s comments came in the preface of a volume published by Shanghai’s 
Commercial Press, and written by a young physical education expert named Song Ruhai. 
Two years earlier, Song had become the first Chinese official representative to the Olym­
pic Games as an observer at the Amsterdam Games of 1928. Now, after two years of 
research and reflection on this journey, Song put out his volume on these and past Olym­
pics, introducing Chinese sport fans to the customs, symbolism and history of the mod­
ern Olympic Games. 
The contribution of Song’s volume is not in its content, most of which seems to have 
been translated and pasted together from foreign sources. Rather, it is most noteworthy 
for the ingenious transliterative device with which he introduced the Olympics to Chi­
nese readers. He rendered “Olympiad,” a concept that would have required extensive 
explanation of historical concepts foreign to many Chinese sport fans, as “Wo neng bi ya” 
(literally, “I can compete!”). Song himself was proud of this transliteration; he felt that it 
“carries great significance—it means that we can all participate in these events and compe­
titions.”2 
This revelation was more significant than we might imagine today, accustomed as we 
are to Chinese athletes’ competitiveness and even dominance in many fields of contempo­
rary sport. In the 1930s, the past century of Chinese engagement with the outside world 
could only be understood as a disgraceful series of humiliations at the hands of the Euro­
pean, American and Japanese imperialist powers. Beginning with the Opium War, con­
cluded in 1842 by the rapacious Treaty of Nanjing, the sovereignty and territory of the 
Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) and of the early Republic of China (1912- 1949) had been 
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nibbled away by these busy and proud imperialist nations. The process by which the 
imperialists extracted territories, unequal treaties, indemnities, and privileges from the 
Chinese was so established during this century that it even merited its own proper name 
in Chinese—guafen, or “cutting up the melon.” 
The “scientific” explanation by which the process of cutting up the Chinese melon, 
and other Asian, African and Latin American melons all around the world, was justified— 
Social Darwinism and its doctrines of competition and the fit race—had entered China in 
the mid-1890s.3 However, these notions had served much more commonly to explain 
and reify Chinese inadequacies, political, physical, and psychological, than to inspire Chi­
nese faith in their ability to compete with the wealthy and strong foreign powers. Song’s 
1930 formulation of an Olympic significance for the Chinese people was momentous, 
then, as he dared the growing and vibrant Chinese sport community to dream of an 
Olympic future of their own.4 
Thus, the official decision to send Chinese delegations to join the 1932, and later the 
1936, Olympic Games represented the ultimate test of a newly emergent and ambitious 
(if somewhat self-doubting) Chinese sporting community. Steven Pope has described the 
important role of sport, and baseball in particular, in fashioning, consolidating and sus­
taining American ideologies of democracy, civilization and national vigor.5 If no sport 
truly qualified to be called a Chinese national pastime—although in 1935 a national 
sport magazine tried to settle once and for all the question, “Which type of game or sport 
should our nation take as its national pastime (guomin youxi)?”6—modern sport repre­
sented to many Chinese an important avenue by which their nation could reach similar 
national values that would nourish a modern China that could survive in the world. On 
an Olympic stage, the stakes were clearly more than merely the reputation of China’s 
basketball, soccer, swimming, and track and field programs. The Chinese citizens who 
saw their Olympic representatives off to the West and followed their performances via the 
mainstream print media all knew that the very Chinese nation, its race and its people, 
would all be coming under close and lasting examination on the playing fields of Los 
Angeles and Berlin. 
These 1930s Olympic Games were not the first Chinese appearances on the interna­
tional sporting stage. By 1932 Chinese athletes had participated in nine Far Eastern Cham­
pionship Games. The Far Eastern Games, a predecessor of today’s Asian Games originally 
founded by YMCA personnel in East Asia, were (usually) a biennial affair featuring Chi­
nese, Japanese and Filipino athletes.7 Unfortunately for the ambitious Chinese sport world, 
these Games were usually dominated by the world-class Japanese athletes. In the 1930s, as 
war with Japan loomed over the horizon, the decided Chinese sporting inferiority vis-à-vis 
the Japanese seemed a frightful portent of the Chinese nation’s weakness and inability to 
withstand a Japanese invasion. Not surprisingly, this Olympic moment would mean sim­
ply that much more to the Chinese public. The Olympic Games of 1932 and 1936, and 
the unprecedented attention Chinese athletes would receive in Los Angeles and Berlin, 
these most modern of modern metropolises, posed a welcome but crucial challenge to a 
Chinese nation desperately in need of a truly international triumph of almost any kind. 
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Like a Fisherman in a Peach-Blossom Haven: The 1932 Olympic Games 
By 1932, China and its urban population were no strangers to the ideologies of sport, 
national will and accomplishment that defined the Olympic movement, Pierre de 
Coubertin’s “republic of muscles.”8 China’s entry into this grand international commu­
nity was made by a single pioneer venturing out West—a 22-year-old fruitpicker’s son 
named Liu Changchun. 
Liu’s rise to national fame began at age 14, when he won the 100 and 400 meter 
sprints at a Japanese-run Kantôshû (Guandongzhou) Track Meet held in his native Dalian, 
a Japanese-controlled port city in the northeast province of Liaoning. As a youth, Liu was 
a soccer enthusiast, joining games with Japanese youngsters in his spare time from his 
work as an apprentice in a glass factory and as a city bus ticket-taker. The Northeastern 
University (Shenyang) soccer team, touring Dalian in 1927, discovered the 17-year-old 
talent. Liu returned with the team to the provincial capital at Shenyang, where he was 
enrolled in the Northeastern Prep School, and provided with free tuition and board. These 
were granted courtesy of University President Zhang Xueliang, son of the Manchurian 
warlord Zhang Zuolin, and the soon-to-be commander of China’s northeastern armies 
after the Japanese militarist faction’s assassination of his father in 1928. 
Liu flourished at Northeastern, entering the university in 1929, and profiting greatly 
from the school’s commitment to sport excellence. As a favorite of Zhang Xueliang’s, Liu 
enjoyed a 30 yuan monthly stipend from the university president—a sum that would have 
allowed the young star to live in relative comfort. Zhang’s hiring of a German ex-world 
champion to coach track at Northeastern, and his frequent sponsorship of meets pitting 
his athletes against Japanese, French and German track stars, allowed Liu to progress even 
further. In a stretch of six months, Liu took the Chinese sport world by storm, winning 
two silver medals at an October 1929 Japanese-German-Chinese meet in Shenyang, and 
then winning three golds in his historic performance at the 1930 National Games in 
Hangzhou.9 
The China National Amateur Athletic Federation, the official ROC sport body, an­
nounced on May 25, 1932 that they had no plans to send a team to Los Angeles that 
July.10 However, an official Japanese announcement made just four days later sent the 
Chinese sport community into a nervous rage. Only months before, Japanese armies, 
with the support of Manchu independence forces and former officials of the Qing Dy­
nasty, had established a new regime called Manzhouguo, or “land of the Manchus,” in 
what had been the Republic of China’s three northeasternmost provinces. Now, it was 
announced that Liu Changchun and his Northeastern University teammate Yu Xiwei 
would be representing this new puppet Manzhouguo state in the Olympics.11 One patri­
otic sportswriter issued a bold challenge to the Nanjing government, linking its very cred­
ibility to this issue of Olympic participation. Addressing the fact that Japan, with a popu­
lation of some 70 million, was sending a delegation of more than 200 athletes to Los 
Angeles, while “the great Chinese nation of 400 million” could only afford to send an 
official observer, he commented, 
Quite an interesting contrast.... The Education Department says it is because of short­
ages of time and money. The CNAAF says there isn’t sufficient talent. These are not real 
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reasons.... The people devote everything we have to the nation, but the nation sure does 
not do anything to give we the people any hope at all.12 
The galling prospect of China’s most famed sport star running for Olympic gold 
under the flag of the Manzhouguo puppet government was quickly resolved. Liu himself 
made a statement for the Tianjin daily L’Impartial, vowing that “I am of the Chinese race, 
a descendant of the Yellow Emperor. I am Chinese, and will not represent the false 
Manzhouguo at the Games of the Tenth Olympiad.”13 He also swore that he had never 
made any contact with sporting personnel from the puppet regime, assuring his public 
that “my conscience is still with me, and my hot blood still flows—how could I betray the 
nation and serve others like a horse or cow?!”14 
Weeks later, the relief that Liu would not be representing Manzhouguo turned to 
pure Olympic joy. In a dramatic ceremony marking the Northeastern University Physical 
Education Department graduation on July 1, University President Zhang Xueliang, in 
the school’s new home in Beiping, grabbed the national sporting spotlight. He announced 
that he would be donating 8,000 yuan ($2,500 US) for Liu and Yu to run for China in the 
Olympics, with Northeastern instructor Song Junfu accompanying the two as coach and 
translator.15 While national sport officials, funding now in hand, crowed about the im­
portance of joining the sacred Olympic Games, the small Olympic team prepared to 
depart for California. After a quick meeting with Beiping Mayor Zhou Dawen, who 
presented Liu with a new suit for the great occasion,16 Liu and Coach Song left Beiping 
for Shanghai on July 2, while sport officials tried to get in touch with Yu Xiwei in Japa­
nese-occupied Dalian. By the 4th, Liu was in Shanghai, training in public sessions, being 
feted in Olympic banquets, and even making a slapdash two-day film at the Chinese 
Stadium there.17 Yu, on the other hand, was nowhere to be found. Japanese authorities 
still hoped to coax Yu to represent the puppet Manzhouguo state. Their veiled threats, 
along with the policy of informal house arrest applied to Yu and other Northeastern stars 
whom they feared would join the Chinese team, convinced Yu to ignore the Chinese 
Olympic call and stay in Dalian to ensure his family’s safety.18 
After a ceremony at New Pass Pier where CNAAF President Wang Zhengting pre­
sented Liu with the Chinese national flag, the two-man delegation of Liu and Song boarded 
the President Wilson on July 8 for two weeks at sea. While on board the ship, Song wrote 
several letters back to Shanghai, informing the sporting public that Liu was waking up 
every morning at 4:00 for calisthenics, and that Liu fortunately was able to eat Chinese 
cuisine prepared especially for the Olympian. The handful of other Chinese passengers on 
board, all students, included a 13-year-old sport fanatic who impressed Liu and Song with 
his collection of sport pictures and clippings that he took abroad with him.19 All was well 
until the ship made its first stop, in Kobe. There, a crowd of Japanese reporters boarded 
the Wilson to interview Liu, but asked if he was representing Manzhouguo. An infuriated 
Song wrote how he sent them away after “I declared strictly and firmly that the two of us 
represent the great Republic of China.” The Japanese taunting was not over, however, as 
the next day Liu and Song received a telegram from the Japanese Athletic Association 
wishing the “Manzhouguo representatives” good luck in the Olympics!20 
Liu and Song arrived in Los Angeles on July 29, just one day before the Games were 
scheduled to begin, and were greeted by dozens of excited Chinese Californians. A car 
Volume 26, Number 3 548 
CHINA IN THE  OLYMPIC  GAMES 
with police motorcycle escorts, sirens sounding, immediately took the Olympians to the 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce, where the two lodged. After a morning press conference 
the next day, Liu was taken by police escort, followed by five busloads of Chinese-Ameri­
can fans, to the Los Angeles Coliseum for the opening ceremonies. There, Liu and Song 
were joined in the Olympic procession by four Chinese sport officials already in the United 
States, China marching 8th of the 51 nations. Despite sparkling starts in his two races, the 
100 and 200 meter sprint heats, Liu placed fifth and fourth, respectively, and was quickly 
eliminated from competition in both events.21 
The rest of Liu’s stay was devoted to taking in many of the Olympic competitions 
(which he described in great detail in his diary), hobnobbing with members of the Chi­
nese community and even Hollywood stars, and reflecting on the significance of his Olympic 
voyage. Liu recorded in his diary how fans would approach him at the Games or on the 
street, asking if he was a Japanese athlete. When Liu answered that he in fact was Chinese, 
he seemed able to read in their reactions the curious, condescending and simply compli­
cated feelings that Americans had for the Chinese people: 
The people react by shouting out in surprise. Or they say, “Here’s an athlete representing 
the 400 million Chinese,” and then I get surrounded. It’s like they have found some ditty 
fisherman in their peach-blossom haven—they all ask, “You’re the Chinese representa­
tive?” Then they will pat me on the shoulder, saying, “Fine, fine, just great—but it’s really 
too bad that China couldn’t send more athletes.” 
Besides the personal encouragement that Liu gained from his many acquaintances in the 
City of Angels, he was also greatly impressed with the sympathy for China’s plight shown 
by Americans and athletes from other Olympic nations: 
I have paid attention to the attitudes of Americans since I got to the States, and every­
where I go they make me feel as though they really do sympathize with China. It’s the 
same with [athletes from] the smaller nations too ... They don’t say anything explicity, 
but with athletes from all nations, it’s in the sound of their voice when they say, “Japan 
. . . ,” with a bitter laugh. As far as I can tell, almost every nation sympathizes with us ...22 
David Welky has written on the Japanese delegation to these 1932 Olympic Games, 
and the threat that this well-conditioned team of nearly 250 athletes posed to American 
notions of athletic superiority. While the American media tried to dismiss these Japanese 
Olympians as “little brown men” or the “brown-skinned wonders” of these Games,23 the 
charming novelty posed by the stoic Liu Changchun’s one-man Chinese squad provoked 
no such racial fear or insults from his American hosts. 
Liu Changchun’s failure to win any medals during his Olympic travels was treated 
with more leniency than had been earlier Chinese disappointments at the Far Eastern 
Championships. Sport commentators, if thrilled by the fact of Chinese participation in 
the Olympics, were simply more realistic about these world-class Games. One explained 
that Liu went to Los Angeles not with the goal of winning medals, but rather to learn 
from athletes of other nations so that he could spread this knowledge throughout China. 
Another observer was even more honest about his own low expectations, asking how 
anyone expected any Olympic medals to be won by Chinese competing against athletes 
from 50 nations, when China could not even compete among three Asian nations in the 
Far Eastern Games.24 But Chinese Olympic participation was seen as a great step in 
establishing a solid foothold in the community of modern nations. Hao Gengsheng and 
other officials explained earlier that a Chinese Olympic appearance was necessary to main-
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tain a respectable position in the world, and also to offset the effects of the Manzhouguo 
puppet regime possibly sending a team.25 But the great American response and approval 
accorded Liu in Los Angeles made the trip seem even more worthwhile, as the Tianjin-
based The Sporting Weekly observed: 
The [ROC national] flag of the white sun on the blue sky fluttered over the Coliseum, 
alongside the flags of the world’s nations for the first time. This has profound significance 
for out nation ... On July 31, when Liu Changchun ran his 100 meter heat, the audience 
responded with a shockingly intense welcome, with applause that roared like thunder.... 
The fact that out nation’s participation could leave the spectators with this kind of im­
pression is very satisfying.26 
Training as Others Trained: The 1936 Olympic Games 
With the rush that these 1932 Olympics provided the Chinese sporting community, it 
was certain that plans for the next Olympics would not be postponed to such a late hour 
again. Official planning for the 1936 Games at Berlin began in October 1934 as sporting 
officials attended the 18th North China Games in Tianjin.27 One innovation designed to 
facilitate both the training and bureaucratic needs of a modern Olympic team was the 
two-month Qingdao Summer Training Camp, held at Shandong University in July-Au­
gust 1935.28 The CNAAF paid for transportation, room and board for athletes it invited 
or who were recommended by regional sporting bodies. The session was also open to those 
uninvited competitors confident and resourceful enough to pay their own way to Qingdao 
plus 500 yuan ($200 US) to cover the costs of training. These were not trivial costs, as the 
CNAAF had enlisted the services of four top-notch German coaches to supplement the 
work of the top sport names in China, including Camp Director Song Junfu, Assistant 
Director and track coach Ma Yuehan, basketball coach Dong Shouyi, and martial arts 
coach Chu Minyi. 
In 1935, Dong Hanwen, a sprinter hailing from the occupied province of Liaoning, 
was one of the top Northeastern track athletes who had fled to Beiping. Selected to join 
this Qingdao training camp, these weeks in serious Olympic training hold what seem to 
be Dong’s dearest sporting memories. In conversations with me in Taipei in 1995-1996, 
Dong often reminisced about the sporting camaraderie he enjoyed with his fellow Chi­
nese athletes at this session in Qingdao—both in training, and in outsmarting their Ger­
man coaches by climbing out their dormitory windows after curfew to take in the Qingdao 
nightlife. For Dong, who barely missed qualifying for the Olympic track team, this train­
ing camp represented the best and worst of Chinese sport during the 1930s. He spoke at 
length about the “purity” and sportsmanship that existed in friendships between Chinese 
athletes of the day, answering with quizzical or almost disbelieving looks my questions 
about regional identity and sporting competition. Once, as Dong navigated the streets of 
downtown Taipei in his Ford Telstar, I asked if he had felt the same competing against 
Cantonese runners, for example, as he did running against a fellow Northeasterner. Dong 
answered with a stern lecture on the attitude of the “sportsman” (using the English for this 
term), maintaining that “athletes do not worry about politics or personal business, just 
victory.” 
On other occasions, however, Dong talked about the regional favoritism that plagued 
the whole selection process. The Olympic team was selected in a way that North and 
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South would be evenly represented, in order to satisfy the bull-headed Olympic bureau­
crats who were concerned with such unsporting matters. Dong remembers the “behind­
the-scenes” (neimu) corruption of Southerners like Ma Yuehan, who worked to load his 
track team with a majority of Southern athletes. Other authors describe the dirty dealings 
of Northerner Dong Shouyi, who loaded his basketball team with Beiping and Tianjin 
players.29 However, by remembering this regionalism as merely another brand of Repub­
lican-era official “corruption,” Dong is able to keep intact the memories of pure and 
sportsmanlike conduct among dedicated and forthright athletes working for the glory of 
the Chinese nation. Like early twentieth-century America, which Mark Dyreson has for­
mulated as a “sporting republic,” many Chinese of the 1930s shared firmly developed 
notions of the relationship between modern physical culture and a vigorous nation. In­
deed, the concepts of fair play, good sportsmanship, and the connections between vitality 
and liberty, all of which were perfect commonsense in the United States by the first decade 
of the 1900s,30 had been imported wholesale to China’s urban centers via the earlier 
YMCA project of building a new Chinese man for a new Chinese nation. Conversations 
with old-time sportsmen like Dong Hanwen only make it clearer that for many residents 
of the 1930s Republic of China, the future of their nation also depended on whether it 
too could become a true “sporting republic.” 
The omission of runner Li Shiming, another Liaoning native, from the 1936 Olym­
pic team is a particularly unique and egregious example of the regional favoritism that so 
frustrated the Chinese sporting community. Yet it is one that goes unmentioned by this 
gentleman, now too a resident of Taipei, when reflecting on his sporting career today. The 
Qingdao training camp was designed to assemble the backbone of the Olympic delega­
tion to Berlin without having to depend on unreliable one-time marks at the 1935 Na­
tional Games. Training camp guidelines explained that athletes would be automatically 
selected to the Olympic track team if they broke a national record in 1935, had broken a 
national record at an officially-sanctioned meet since 1933, or reached official standards 
listed for each track and field event.31 Li satisfied this final qualification, meeting stan­
dards in two events by finishing a 400 meter trial in 53.2 seconds on July 15, and running 
800 meters in 2:03.3 on July 27. The Chin Fen Sport Monthly even listed his time in the 
800 meters as the “second most valuable achievement of the training camp,” and included 
a picture of Li celebrating his mark with Coaches Ma and Wilhelm Ludwig.32 Despite 
achieving these fine marks, and later lowering his time in the 800 meters to a national 
record 2:01.9 in May 1936 at a meet in Wuxi,33 Li was never allowed to join the Olympic 
team. 
For Li, despite his athletic prowess, was guilty of a grave crime against the Chinese 
nation—the unit that formed the very basis of this entire sporting enterprise. As early as 
1932, Li had joined Manzhouguo “national” track teams organized in Liaoning by this 
new puppet regime. In 1933 and 1934, Li also had represented his hometown Fengtian in 
the Second and Third Manzhouguo National Games held in the new capital at Xinjing.34 
To those who gave little thought to the real life choices made by people living in these 
areas—virtually sacrificed by the Nanjing state to the Japanese—this qualified Li and his 
Manzhouguo teammates as Hanjian, or “traitors to the Han Chinese people.” Even his 
eventual, and more patriotic, choice to leave his Northeast home for Chinese-held terri-
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The Chinese Olympic boxing and weightlifting teams, 1936. Chuxi Di shiyi jie Shijie yundonghui 
Zhonghua daibiaotuan baogao (Official Report of the Chinese Delegation to the XIth Olympiad, 
Berlin, 1936) 
tory and to compete for his Chinese motherland in the Olympic Games was insufficient 
to wash away the nationalist repugnance at his Manzhouguo contamination. For these 
reasons, when the Olympic team left for Berlin, they would be without China’s finest 
middle-distance runner. 
Final selections were made in pressure-filled training sessions in Shanghai in May-
June 1936. Besides the track and field, basketball, weightlifting, and martial arts (guoshu)  
teams, which were assembled after months of practices and competitions, other Chinese 
squads came about through different circumstances. The Chinese soccer team was put 
together solely from Hong Kong Soccer Association teams.35 They came to Shanghai for 
an April 30 game against a Nanjing-Shanghai all-star team and a march before 20,000 
fans against the Shanghai Foreign All-Stars, and then immediately left for Southeast Asia. 
There they played an Olympic fund-raiser exhibition schedule of 27 games in 62 days 
before largely Chinese crowds in Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia, Burma, Malaya and 
Thailand, before meeting the rest of the Olympic team in Bangkok in July.36 China’s four-
member boxing team came from the ranks of Henan Provincial Chairman Shang Qiyu’s 
32nd Army. Shang paid for the boxers’ Olympic trip and also five months of intensive 
training in Shanghai beforehand.37 Chinese Olympic officials were also ecstatic to hear 
that Howard Wing, a Dutch cyclist of Chinese ancestry, shunned the requests of the 
Dutch Olympic Committee in order to be able to ride for his Chinese motherland.38 
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The teams Olympic voyage began on the morning of June 23, when all 55 athletes 
(not including the soccer team or Dutch-Chinese cyclist Wing) and 29 sport officials met 
at the Shanghai North Station in their official dress uniforms—dark suits and ties for the 
men and Qing Dynasty-styled white qipao dresses for the women. They boarded a 6:55 
AM train for Nanjing, arriving in the capital at 2:00 that afternoon. A bus took them first 
to the Sun Yat-sen Memorial, where a quick ceremony was performed, to the headquar­
ters of the militarist Officers’ Moral Endeavor Association for tea, and then to Generalis­
simo Chiang Kai-shek’s home in the Purple Mountains for a short lecture by Chiang and 
a flag presentation ceremony. After returning to Shanghai that night, there were two more 
days of banquets, the largest held by the German Consul in Shanghai at the Great Bright­
ness Theater. The athletes and officials, joined by a large “Olympic inspection group,” 
several reporters, and a group of diehard sport fans paying their own way to cheer on their 
team in Berlin, boarded the Italian steamship Conte Verde at noon on June 26. They were 
sent off with a musical farewell performed by bands from the Shanghai Municipal Gov­
ernment and Shanghai Garrison Command, and a flyover by two aircraft sent by the 
Chinese Aviation Association.39 
The Olympians were on board the Conte Verde for 25 days, making stops in Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok, Bombay, Massawa, and Suez before reaching 
Venice on July 20. Each stop in Southeast Asia brought fabulous welcomes from the 
Chinese populations there. In Singapore, more than 1,000 local Chinese residents greeted 
the team, taking the Olympians in ten cars on a tour of Singapore, and then to a banquet 
hosted by Consul Diao Zuoqian. Huge crowds also attended a basketball scrimmage be­
tween the Chinese Olympians and the Singapore All-Stars, which was followed by a dem­
onstration by the nine-person national martial arts team.40 Many of these Singaporean, 
Malayan and Thai Chinese felt great connections to and loyalties toward the Chinese 
Republic and its attempts to bring the land of their forefathers into a new modern future. 
Others who may have felt more loyal to their Southeast Asian homelands could still root 
for these Chinese athletic teams, with the knowledge that a China known around the 
world for its vigor and strength could promise better treatment from the European colo­
nial masters. For these diverse reasons, then, the Chinese residents of these colonies could 
all find much for which to cheer in these Chinese exhibitions of modern sport and ancient 
martial arts.41 
Yet despite these rousing welcomes at each port of call, the long trip at sea was not 
meant to be a pleasure cruise for the Chinese Olympians. Rather, a detailed regimen was 
designed to prepare the team physically, mentally, and linguistically for their important 
tasks. Beginning Monday, June 29, the athletes’ day began with mandatory morning cal­
isthenics from 7:00 to 7:30, and then specific training exercises from 8:00 to 9:00 on 
deck, which often gathered gawking crowds of foreign tourists. After lunch, lectures were 
scheduled every day from 1:00 to 2:00, followed by one hour of German class and one 
more hour of physical training.42 After-dinner free time for many members was occupied 
by singing and dancing practice, as they prepared for a “China Night” program to be held 
later in the trip.43 Unfortunately, these plans did not last long. By the first week of the 
trip, athletes and coaches alike became violently seasick almost daily. Hurdler and sprinter 
Cheng Jinguan, now living in Suzhou, remembers the waves getting even worse on the 
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The Chinese Olympic delegation leaving the Berlin train station after arrival on July 23, 1936. 
Chuxi Di shiyi Shijie yundonghui Zhonghua daibiaotuan baogao (Official Report of the Chinese 
Delegation to the XIth Olympiad, Berlin, 1936) 
10-day leg of the trip from Bombay to Italy—so bad that few of the Olympians could 
even hold food down, let alone train or study German, by the end of the trip.44 
After their ship finally docked in the middle of the night on July 20-21, the weary 
athletes were greeted in the Conte Verde’s concert hall by the German Consul to Italy, a 
representative of the Chinese Consul to Italy, and representatives of Chinese student asso­
ciations in Germany and Italy. Finally, at 3:00 AM, they were allowed to get off the boat 
and leave for the warm and anchored beds of Venice’s Continental Hotel. After a day’s rest, 
the team left on the morning of the 22nd for Munich. After arriving in the “Cradle of the 
German Revolution” at 7:00 PM, the team was welcomed by Chinese and German repre­
sentatives, and whisked off by the mayor to see the sacred site of Hitler’s revolution and 
the Memorial to the Martyrs of the Revolution, all in the four hour interval before their 
11:00 train left for Berlin that same night.45 
The team’s arrival in Berlin was a memorable one for all involved. Arriving in the 
Olympic host city at 9:00 AM on July 23, the team was greeted by 300 exuberant Overseas 
Chinese and Chinese students, all chanting “Long live the Republic of China,” and wav­
ing Chinese flags that Berlin restaurants had been selling in the days before the team 
arrived. The celebratory ceremony inside the train station included speeches by Cheng 
Tianfang, Chinese ambassador to Germany; German IOC member Dr. Ritter V. Hart; 
and Chinese Olympic delegation leader Shen Siliang, who concluded his speech with a 
ringing call (repeated three times), “Long live the Republic of China! Long live Ger-
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many!” Li Huitang, soccer team captain, carried the Chinese flag as the team marched 
smartly out of the station—so smartly that one Berlin paper noted the Chinese team as 
“these Olympics’ most orderly delegation.”46 This was also the proudest moment of the 
whole Olympics for Cheng Jinguan, who remembers clearly the crowds of Berliners who 
came to the Berlin train station out of great curiosity. The march out of the train station 
was a great victory for Cheng, as the Olympians were finally able to convince these “for­
eigners” of the truth about the Chinese people. As Cheng recalls it, “They thought that 
Chinese men wore little hats and Chinese women had little bound feet, but we came out 
wearing Western suits!”47 
This sense of Chinese ascendancy to a new level of international recognition runs 
thick in Chinese historical sources and memories of the 1936 Olympics. Shen Siliang 
remarked after the Games were over, 
during the Olympics, the Chinese flag was on all the stands, and on the streets it was 
plainly seen, with those of other nations. The sight of our delegation, marching in orderly 
array, training as others trained, participating in games, was all good propaganda. At least 
other people are now aware we are a nation to be counted.... 
Some Chinese observers were critical of this approach, calling the government simply vain 
to spend 170,000 yuan ($51,300 US)48 to send “some athletes who will suffice ... just so 
that the flag of the white sun on the blue sky can flap above the Berlin Olympic Sta­
dium.”49 But Shen rebuffed this utilitarian critique, asking the Chinese sport world to 
abandon pure economics for the grandeur of the Olympics and its world-recognized sym­
bols: “The achievement of international recognition alone is worth millions to us as a 
nation, and more than justifies the amount spent on the tour.... I believe [the athletes] 
Jesse Owens and Cheng Jinguan Photo courtesy of Cheng Jinguan 
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have accomplished more for China than several ambassadors could have achieved in years.”50 
For those who stressed these international symbols, the Olympians’ arrival in Berlin itself 
represented a de facto Chinese triumph. 
The particular circumstances of these Olympic Games also contributed to this sense 
of victory. The Chinese athletes were well aware of recent political events in Hitler’s Ger­
many, and even if envying in many ways the military strength of the revitalized German 
Völker, many felt “great discomfort” at the racial policies of their Nazi hosts. Indeed, a 
photo taken as the team marched out of the Berlin train station on July 23 shows the 
athletes looking coolly straight ahead, perhaps having mixed emotions about the smart 
Sieg Heil salutes accorded them by the workers, sailors and officials who crowded along 
the walkway.51 In the opening ceremonies held days later, the Chinese were one of the few 
teams not to salute Germany’s number one sport fan, Adolf Hitler, with the Sieg Heil; a 
photo shows the team passing in front of Hitler’s viewing stand holding their Olympic 
hats over their hearts with their right hands.52 Cheng Jinguan remembers the “totally 
fascist” atmosphere of these ceremonies—the Luftwaffe airplanes and Zeppelin soaring 
over the stadium, and the roar of the German audience for Hitler as he took his seat. 
Cheng told me proudly that he and his teammates never stood for the Nazi flag, although 
they did stand for the German national flag, as “respect for other country’s flags is just part 
of the Olympic spirit.”53 
The quadruple-gold accomplishments of American track hero Jesse Owens at these 
Berlin Olympics also provided the Chinese team with the inspiration that even in the 
fierce modern world, the racial underdog could indeed triumph. Painfully aware of the 
racist policies and worldviews of the globe’s imperialist powers, many Chinese saw these 
Olympics as an opportunity to present the New Chinese Man and Woman, and to prove 
the strength of the modernized Chinese race, to the world. If no medals were captured by 
Chinese athletes, Owens’ victories were still very meaningful in that the Chinese could 
feel solidarity with other races oppressed in this vicious twentieth century. After the Games, 
one Chinese progressive praised Owens’ record-shattering efforts, proclaiming that his 
performance had “destroyed the poisonous myth of white supremacy.”54 Another asked 
defiantly, “Now who says the colored races (youse renzhong) are inferior to the white race?!”55 
Owens’s presence at these Games was also personally significant for Cheng Jinguan, 
who became friends with the American champion during training sessions. Cheng’s smooth 
Soochow University English was more than sufficient to allow him to chat with Owens 
and ask for technical training and running tips. This Olympic friendship was captured for 
posterity on film, in a snapshot of Owens, the very picture of the relaxed and confident 
sportsman, clad in his USA sweat suit, with one arm around and the other clasping the 
hand of a stiff Cheng in sweater, tie and slacks. This photo, determinedly preserved by 
Cheng through the xenophobic chaos and brutality of the Cultural Revolution,56 has 
become a treasured artifact of Chinese Olympic history. In October 1996, Suzhou mu­
nicipal postal authorities released a limited edition commemorative envelope featuring a 
reproduction of this picture to mark the 100th anniversary of the modern Olympic move­
ment and the 60th anniversary of China’s participation in the Berlin Games.57 The politi­
cal context of these 1936 Olympics has been largely forgotten in the PRC today, and 
Chinese participation in these Games is now commemorated to reflect more on Chinese 
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nationalism than on any dated notions of racial solidarity. Yet 60 years ago, Owens’s Olympic 
conquest was an event of great significance for the Chinese sport community, providing 
the sorely needed proof that there was hope for oppressed peoples around the world, 
African-Americans and Han Chinese alike. 
It was fortunate that Chinese athletes were able to take home with them this type of 
victory, as there were few others. The results of these Games confirmed the fears of Chi­
nese who felt that their nation was still unable, as one critic put it, “to produce men like 
Jesse Owens.”58 The long trip aboard the Conte Verde simply had sapped the Chinese 
athletes of their strength. Longshots for Olympic honors to begin with, they turned in yet 
another disappointing performance. Of the 19 track athletes in Berlin, only pole vaulter 
Fu Baolu managed to advance past the initial trials and into actual medal competition. 
But even Fu, ill the day of his event, was quickly eliminated with a top mark of 3.80 
meters, a full 25 centimeters off his personal best of 4.05 meters. 
Cheng Jinguan’s Olympic hopes were dimmed for different reasons. Cheng’s best 
event was the 400 meter hurdles. He was well-known in China for his unorthodox hur­
dling style, in which he folded his trailing leg inside, close to his groin, rather than to the 
outside. But when the team arrived in Berlin, team leader and CNAAF Secretary Shen 
Siliang pulled Cheng aside to inform him that he would not run the hurdles in Berlin. 
When a confused Cheng asked why, Shen answered, “Not only does no one else in China 
use your hurdling style, but no one else in the world does. When the winners cross the 
finish line, you will still have 30-40 meters left to go, and you will lose face for China 
[with your strange style and poor time].” A disheartened Cheng joined several of the 
sprinting competitions instead, but was quickly eliminated from all of them with disap­
pointing times that he now attributes to the rough month at sea.59 
China’s other entries provided little to cheer about either. The soccer team, even more 
spent after their whirlwind trip of South Asia, lost to Britain 2-0 after a gutsy performance 
before a crowd which included Ambassador Cheng and 600 Chinese fans. The basketball 
team managed to win one game in the consolation bracket against the French, but lost 
decisively to Japan, Peru and Brazil.60 China’s best Olympic hope, Dutch cyclist Howard 
Wing, crashed on his fifth lap around the Berlin velodrome, ending his medal hopes.61 
One of the few bright spots of these Berlin Olympics came with the demonstrations 
performed by the nine-member (six men, three women) martial arts (guoshu) team, se­
lected after extensive tryouts at Shanghai like the other squads. In a significant gesture of 
self-Orientalization, the martial arts team was sent with the official Olympic team in 
order to share the wonders of China’s “ancient sport” and Chinese culture in general with 
the modern sporting fans of Europe and the world. During the trip to Germany, martial 
arts demonstrations were a large part of the exhibitions held for the Singapore Chinese, 
and “Olympic Evening” and “China Night” variety shows performed aboard the Conte 
Verde. In Germany before the Games began, the group performed before Hamburg audi­
ences at an International Concert, an International Boxing Exhibition and an Interna­
tional Sport Carnival, and then before Berlin crowds at a military camp and an Interna­
tional Sport Research Camp.62 As another way of promoting the Chinese native martial 
arts, the CNAAF made a German-language film of national team coach (and Secretary of 
the Executive Department of the Republic of China) Chu Minyi demonstrating taijiquan 
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as well as his own brand of “taiji-calisthenics,” shuttlecock and archery, especially for 
entry in the Olympic Sport & Physical Education Film contest held in Berlin during the 
Games.63 
The biggest moment came on August 9, when the martial arts squad put on a one-
hour demonstration in the Olympic stadium before some 30,000 fans. Chu’s own “taiji­
calisthenics,” a six-segment, three-minute routine he designed in order to synthesize the 
most useful elements of the ancient taijiquan and modern calisthenics,64 served as an 
appropriate opening to this performance. These martial artists, and the state that spon­
sored them, hoped to give the sport fans of Berlin and the world an understanding of the 
glories of traditional Chinese culture—but more specifically the fact that this Chinese 
culture could be modified, modernized, and fitted into the twentieth-century world. Their 
taiji-calisthenics, and the other modernized and synthesized martial arts sets they per­
formed, were meant to represent a China, perhaps even a Chinese modernity, that was 
truly fit for the modern world. It is doubtful that these nuances of the exotic Chinese 
movements they watched were apparent to the Berlin crowd, but it was an impressive 
spectacle nonetheless, for which the fans’ “applause reverberated up to the heavens.”65 
This sign of approval from the German people must have come as a great relief for the 
entire Chinese Olympic team, although many likely wished the crowd might have af­
forded the same welcome to Chinese athletes participating in actual Olympic medal events. 
Of all the indignities that the team did suffer in Berlin, the defeat of Chinese boxing 
standout Jin Guidi was particularly galling for the Chinese sporting community, as it 
captured in perfect microcosm the weakness of China’s position in the 1930s world order. 
Middleweight Jin, fighting British Dick Shrimpton on August 11, got off to a good start, 
especially punishing Shrimpton’s jaw. After Jin delivered a quick left-right combination, 
the Briton got Jin into a clinch. As the referee separated the two boxers, Shrimpton, with 
a “terrifying charge,” delivered a left upper-arm blow to Jin’s head that put him down for 
the 10-count. A side judge quickly intervened, ruling that Shrimpton’s charge had come 
before the referee had separated the fighters, disqualifying Shrimpton, and awarding Jin 
the victory. The British manager protested the ruling. The next day, an Olympic boxing 
rules committee decided that Shrimpton’s infraction was not serious enough to warrant 
disqualification, and named the Briton the winner on the basis of his knockout. The 
Chinese delegation argued the point, but did not issue an official protest, instead electing 
to have Jin carry the Chinese flag during the Olympic closing ceremonies as a more un­
derstated and symbolic show of objection.66 
Commenting days later, the Western sporting press in Shanghai, perhaps even re­
lieved by the decision which kept Olympic gold in white fists, praised Jin and the Chinese 
Olympians for accepting 
without murmur the judges’ reversal of their own earlier decision against the Briton.... 
Pettiness and a lack of spirit would have prompted the Chinese to protest the second 
decision and demand that the bout be refought.... But [ Jin Guidi ] and the entire Chi­
nese delegation chose the course of honor. 
This sportwriter was so impressed that he declared, “This one incident has covered China’s 
athletic representatives with glory. They are bringing back intact the laurel they wore with 
them to the Olympic Games—the spirit of genuine sportsmanship.”67 
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Chinese observers, on the other hand, were hardly as delighted by the capricious 
discarding of one of their very few Olympic triumphs. Many compared the Chinese ac­
ceptance of this wrongful defeat with the actions of the Peruvian soccer team, who charged 
onto the field to argue with referees, and then withdrew from their game against Austria 
after a bad call went against them. One writer lamented, 
Just like our territory is always being invaded, this is not anything new or curious. China 
is always being bullied, and our tolerance is even greater than that of the Peruvians! Some 
have said, in exaggeration, that this event illustrates the Chinese penchant for generos­
ity—“Oh, it doesn’t matter, it’s all right!” 
Citing the pathetic self-defeating protagonist of Lu Xun’s novella critiquing China’s 1911 
Revolution, he continued, “Ah Q-style Chinese are really too plentiful to count.”68 
This theme of failure dominated the post-Olympics evaluations delivered by mem­
bers of the Chinese sport community. To the reader of today, it seems odd that supporters 
of the Chinese team could turn on the team so viciously as to write, “How badly they have 
failed, all the world knows.”69 Conditioned by ideologies of fair play and “it’s how you 
play the game,” it is easy for us today to pretend to ignore that other strain of sporting 
ideology which ridicules those nice guys who finish last. Few Chinese fans, desperate for 
any sign of success on the world stage, seem to have suffered from this sportsmanlike 
cognitive dissonance. They wanted to win. Any victory would have done—any true vic­
tory, that is. The Chinese soccer team’s pride at their strong showing in their 2-0 loss to 
Britain, was again derisively dismissed as mere “Ah Q-style self-consolation.”70 
Hurdler-sprinter Cheng Jinguan remembers well the humiliation of representing a 
population of 400 million but not being able to garner any Olympic laurels at all. He 
remembers Shanghai newspapers mocking the team’s “goose egg” in the points column, 
or as another wrote, their failure “to salvage even half a bronze medal!”71 China’s Olympic 
athletes were raked over the coals for their failure. An author in The Sino-Foreign Monthly 
opined that not only were their techniques “lacking in scientific quality,” but that they 
were “too corrupt and truly in need of reform. Some say that among students, the athletes 
and ballplayers mostly do not study, but enjoy making girlfriends and other bad habits. 
And the women [athletes], since they worship the sporting crowd, enjoy being in these 
same circles.”72 One educator suggested that the Chinese athletes’ failure was due to their 
“lack of spiritual discipline.”73 An author in The China Critic pointed out that Chinese 
athletes “have not yet realized that the skillfulness or tactics of a sportsman and his ‘spirit’ 
... few of the Chinese athletes have the guts or that determination to win.”74 Another 
simply dismissed them as “bad winners,” “cajoled into thinking themselves tin gods by an 
indulgent public.”75 
One point on which almost all seemed to be in agreement was the idea that the 
Chinese body, diagnosed to be still too weak and sickly even after 25 years of Republican 
rule, was truly to blame. Head Olympic delegate Shen Siliang, upon returning to Shang­
hai, simply remarked that “[Chinese] physiques are underdeveloped (luohou), and just not 
fit enough to compete with others.” An educator from remote Shanxi Province found 
several factors that contributed to the Olympic “failure’‘—Chinese high death rates and 
short lifespans, a supposedly “traditional” Chinese ideology that subordinated the physi­
cal to the cultural and literary, and even the legacy of the weak Qing state.76 Another 
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observer explained simply that good marks in the Olympics wouId only be achieved when 
they accurately represented “the physiques of a healthy citizenry.”77 
The standard for comparison was clearly the hated Japanese—this race, formerly 
scorned by Chinese as “hairy dwarves,” which now ranked among the world’s economic, 
military and athletic powers. Even before the Olympics began, one author had warned the 
sporting public, “There are no Chinese among the heroes atop the international athletic 
stage! The success of our eastern neighbors’ [i.e., Japan’s] heroes on the international ath­
letic stage is a fine example of endurance of hardship and self-motivation for our Chinese 
athletes!”78 After 18 Japanese medal triumphs at Berlin—eighth place overall—Chinese 
sport enthusiasts were in even greater awe of Japanese progress. One author wondered, 
“Their physique is no better than ours; they are usually shorter in height. There are one 
hundred and one things that can be said to be similar between these two nationalities. 
Why are they so far ahead of us?”79 Nationally-known track and field expert Xie Siyan 
proclaimed the Japanese example the most suitable for Chinese reference, citing in par­
ticular the Japanese self-discipline, deep understanding of physical education and the body, 
and even the pride taken by Japan’s everyday physical education instructors in their work.80 
The outstanding performance by Japanese athletes before the eyes of the sporting 
world clearly made the Chinese “failure” in Berlin that much more unpalatable and por­
tentous. As a result, China’s sporting community saw no choice but to get back to the 
basics of building a strong Chinese body, and thus looked to the “mass sport” programs 
imported into China from Germany, Italy and Japan in the early 1930s. Many of those 
who had devoted their careers to promoting these “mass” forms of physical culture were 
radically authoritarian—even fascist—intellectuals and physical education experts who 
saw mass sport as the absolute antithesis of the “individualist” sport of the Olympic Games. 
They also understood a concentration on mass exercise and physical fitness to be a quick 
and effective solution to the disunity and selfish excesses brought on by China’s emphasis 
on these competitive sporting forms.81 Clearly, the goals of many of these “mass sport” 
diehards were quite different from those who looked to a “mass-ized” (minzhongha ) 
emphasis on sport that would create a deeper pool of potential Olympic talent for the 
Chinese nation. Yet the faith in the “mass-izing” of physical education as a cure-all was the 
same. For those who immediately began working towards a stronger Chinese delegation 
for the 1940 Olympic Games to be held in Tokyo,82 “mass sport” would be the key to 
transforming and creating Chinese bodies that could win honors for their motherland on 
the most international of international stages. 
It is interesting to examine the post-Berlin diagnoses of Western observers in China, 
who clearly had no understanding of the national significance that the Chinese sporting 
public placed in this Olympic entry. In a remarkable move that erased the Western role in 
introducing the sport cult of victory to China, the foreign media in China made warm 
and fuzzy feelings of sportmanship and graciousness the only allowable reactions to the 
outcomes of the recent Games. They saw the criticism of the medal-less Chinese delega­
tion as “ignorant,” explaining to Chinese fans, still unschooled in the ways of the sports­
man, that the goals of the Chinese Olympic team merely were “to display the utmost 
sportsmanship under all circumstances, and thus impress the civilized world with the fact 
that in China the athletes are taught and understand what sportsmanship really is.”83 
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Unsurprisingly, few Chinese observers bought this defeatist line of reasoning, instead 
choosing to be honest about the simple failure of these pampered Olympians to give the 
Chinese nation a return on the considerable resources invested in their sport. Two delega­
tions had traveled abroad to join in the Olympic Games, in 1932 and 1936, in front of 
the eyes of the world, and at no small expense to national coffers. And the “goose egg” next 
to China’s name in the official medal tally was not acceptable to a sporting community 
who, for years now, had been chanting, “We can compete!” 
Conclusion 
The medals won and records set by PRC athletes in Olympic and other international 
competitions today are understood, inside and outside of China, as unquestionable proof 
of China’s superpower status in the world, and of the ruling Chinese Communist Party’s 
hegemony within the PRC. The Republican-era goose eggs earned by the Chinese delega­
tions to the 1932 and 1936 (and later, 1948) Olympic Games have become a dead-on 
caricature of the inadequacies and weakness of “Old China.” These failures serve as a 
perfect metonym for China’s pre-Liberation agonies and defeats suffered at the hands of 
the powerful imperialist nations of the world, who, not coincidentally, no longer dare to 
perpetrate these aggressions on the citizens of the Communists’ China. 
These pre- 1949 Olympic misfortunes are now scorned by a late 1990s China, fiercely 
nationalistic and proudly materialistic, where might is as right as weakness and defeat are 
laughable and pathetic. Such a front-running and teleological view of these early Chinese 
Olympic experiences surely is not a becoming one. Yet neither is one that sees these Chi­
nese entries—their one-man team in 1932, their “authentically Chinese” martial arts 
exhibition of 1936—as merely diverse or colorful footnotes to the “real” record-setting 
athletic action of these Los Angeles and Berlin Games. These Chinese experiences at the 
1932 and 1936 Olympic Games must be understood as much more than this, capturing 
as they do the sincere hopes and dreams of an oppressed nation to make its stand, to 
compete on the international stage, and truly to become “a nation to be counted.” 
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